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Commentaries on Prospects for CFE Talks

Pact Troop Cuts Create 'New Situation'

HK0303103289 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
3 Mar 89 p 3

["International Outlook" column by Fang Rongxuan (2455 2837 5503): "The New Situation Regarding European Disarmament Talks"]

[Text] The European talks on conventional disarmament will resume in the near future. People now wait to see if the longstanding deadlock will be broken this time.

The upcoming talks are noteworthy because of some new conditions, such as the unilateral disarmament actions of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has announced that it will reduce its troops stationed on its own territory and in East European countries by 500,000 in the next 2 years, and will withdraw some weapons and military equipment from Eastern Europe. Along with the action taken by the Soviet Union, various East European countries have also successively announced their own plans to reduce their conventional troops. So far, six of the seven Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union, have announced different degrees of unilateral disarmament. This attracted special attention from international opinion.

According to the explanation of the Soviet Union and various East European countries, their decisions on unilateral disarmament served the purposes of first, readjusting their own military forces so as to make them "more defensive in nature" and second, "further advancing the detente process and promoting the successful holding of the talks on reducing armaments in Europe in March."

NATO countries have prudently welcomed the unilateral disarmament actions taken by the Soviet Union and various East European countries, but refused to take reciprocal action. NATO's explanation is that the military forces deployed in Europe by the Warsaw Pact exceeds NATO's in quantity. It seems that NATO's reaction was rather passive. As many Western people pointed out, although the action taken by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not thoroughly eliminate the imbalance in strength between the two major military blocs, it will still play a positive role in promoting the disarmament and detente process in Europe.

Through painstaking bargaining at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in early January of this year, a compromise was reached on the target, form, and scope of the talks on conventional disarmament in Europe, and both sides agreed to maintain Europe's stability and security through realizing a low level of land-based conventional military force ensured by effective and strict verification measures. Opinion is that this was a follow-up meeting that made the greatest progress

since the Helsinki Conference in 1975, and it terminated the situation in which no result had been achieved for 14 years in the field of balanced disarmament in Central Europe.

In view of the above background and especially the current detente tendency in the international situation, people again pin hopes on the coming talks on reducing conventional military forces in Europe. It is hoped that the talks will not be the continuation of "dialogue between the deaf" and will reach a disarmament agreement favorable to Europe's peace and stability. At the same time, people are also aware that it is hard for the two major military blocs in Europe to remove their mutual distrust caused by serious confrontation over the past decades, so the coming talks will be another round of hard bargaining.

'Sincerity and Determination Decisive Factor'

OW0803020589 Beijing XINHUA in English
0858 GMT 5 Mar 89

["News Analysis: Another Round of East-West Disarmament Bargaining (by Xiao Li)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Vienna, March 4 (XINHUA)—Eastern and Western negotiators are gathering in Vienna to attend a new round of disarmament talks, due to begin Monday, aimed at establishing a lower-level balance of conventional forces in Europe.

The talks between the major opposing military blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—is widely predicted to be a "protracted and complex" one, but with constructive progress.

Thirty-five foreign ministers from the member countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—the United States, Canada, and all European countries except Albania—will be in Vienna for a 3-day opening ceremony. This event is described as a "display of goodwill" by both sides.

The talks, the first in post-war time that cover conventional forces deployed in every part of Europe, will focus on a lower level of conventional arsenals in a bid to diminish both sides' capabilities to launch surprise attacks and large-scale offensives.

The arms category to be bargained on covers all conventional arms and forces, including conventional parts of (nuclear and conventional) dual-purpose systems, that are deployed in the vast area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. The talks will not involve naval facilities and chemical and nuclear weapons.

Military planners from the East and West are said to work out ceilings for some kind of arms and the way to use effective verifications to maintain a lower-level balance if achieved.

It had proved to be a difficult job due to the dispute over the assertions of each other's forces deployed in Europe. Such disputes had stalemated the central European conventional disarmament talks for 15 years before it was enlarged to cover the weapons in the whole of Europe.

NATO and Warsaw Pact announced their analyses on conventional power parity later last year and early this year respectively. NATO, claiming in its reports that the Warsaw Pact enjoys nearly 3:2 superiority in total troops in Europe and an absolute superiority in tanks, aircraft, and artillery over the West, demanded the Warsaw Pact reduce by half of its conventional forces.

The Warsaw Pact, on the contrary, claimed that it has almost the same number of troops as NATO has in Europe while NATO has more naval forces. It demanded the West cut naval forces in Europe unilaterally.

The dispute eased with the Vienna follow-up meeting, which concluded in mid-January of this year. Both sides have expressed willingness to diminish the imbalance so as to establish confidence and create a good atmosphere for the talks.

Stephen Ledogar, chief U.S. delegate in the coming negotiations, recently told the press here that NATO will quit the quarrels on the data and specifications of arms categories and strive at the coming round for the ceilings for some conventional arms.

He revealed that the Western alliance might suggest in the talks that each side should deploy in Europe no more than 20,000 tanks, 27,500 armored vehicles and 16,500

guns, with no single country of either side possessing more than 30 percent of the total of each kind deployed by both sides.

History of disarmament in Europe has taught people to be realistic when being optimistic.

On one hand, people have every reason to be optimistic when detente, seeking for dialogue and cooperation and willingness to iron out differences have created a good political basis for arms negotiations between East and West. The unilateral cut of conventional arms announced by the Eastern Bloc also contributed to a certain degree of confidence between the two sides and the possibility of constructing a safer Europe.

But, on the other hand, they could not hope that the confrontation that has lasted for over 40 years could be solved in 1 day or in 1 round of talks.

Beside the considerable differences of stances of the two sides on conventional disarmament, they have also problems within their own blocs, which would affect the progress of the current talks.

NATO members are still arguing whether they should modernize their short-range nuclear missiles, a kind of weapon that could also be used conventionally, while the Eastern countries are facing unstable social problems in their multi-form reforms.

Conventional disarmament also has its special difficulties, such as the wide range that should be covered, complex categories of weapons, and difficulties in verification. Any one could bring a deadlock to the talks.

Nevertheless, the decisive factor in the field is the sincerity and determination to reduce arms and seek a way to a safer world. That is the key for a successful round of conventional disarmament talks.

INTRABLOC

Warsaw Pact Disarmament Commission Meets in Bucharest

Preparations for CFE Talks Discussed

LD0103170789 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1617 GMT 1 Mar 89

[Text] Bucharest (ADN)—The fifth session of the special commission of the Warsaw Pact member states on disarmament questions at the deputy foreign ministerial level took place in Bucharest on Tuesday and Wednesday. The delegations included responsible representatives of the allied states' foreign ministries and defense ministries.

At the meeting, questions concerning the preparation of the negotiations starting in Vienna on reducing conventional armed forces and on confidence- and security-building measures were discussed. The problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was also discussed.

The meeting proceeded in a businesslike and comradely atmosphere, in a spirit of mutual understanding and constructive cooperation.

The delegation leaders were received by Romanian Foreign Minister Ioan Totu.

Deputy Foreign Minister Oancea Represents Romania

AU0103191189 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1851 GMT 1 Mar 89

["Proceedings of Special Commission on Disarmament Issues of the Warsaw Treaty Participant States"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 01/03/1989—On 28 February-1 March, 1989, Bucharest was the venue of the proceedings of the Special Commission on Disarmament Issues of the Warsaw Treaty Participant States, at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The delegations included senior staff of the ministries of foreign affairs and the ministries of defense of the participant countries.

Analysis was made of the questions related to the preparation of the negotiations due to start in Vienna on the armed forces and conventional armaments and on the adoption of new measures to strengthen confidence and security in Europe. The question of tactical nuclear means in Europe was also approached.

On Romania's behalf, the proceedings of the session were attended by Constantin Oancea, deputy minister of foreign affairs.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Conclusion of MBFR Negotiations Viewed

AU0602132089 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
3 Feb 89 p 7

[CTK report from Vienna: "Conclusion to the Vienna Negotiations After 15 Years"]

[Text] Vienna —Following 15 years without agreement the negotiations on reducing the amount of armed forces and arms in central Europe came to an end in Vienna on Thursday [2 February]. The negotiations were concluded on the basis of the decision by the 23 member states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to begin new discussions in Vienna in March on conventional armed forces in the whole of Europe.

It is reported in the final document that since 1973, a serious dialogue between East and West has been maintained on security questions. It was the first multilateral forum scrutinizing a series of problems connected with the attempt to strengthen security and stability in Europe. It proved that the extent of the common ground was not enough for the participants to be able to agree on a treaty. Nevertheless, the positions of both sides moved closer together on a number of issues.

The spokesman for the Czechoslovak delegation, Ivan Broz, in a conversation with a CTK correspondent, among others, said that the experiences gained were valuable and will certainly be utilized during the new negotiations. It primarily transpired that in disarmament negotiations all of the participants must have a sense for the realities of international development, positive political will for achieving tangible results, the capability of having a flexible approach to even the most sensitive problems, and the courage to accept the necessary compromises.

Defense Minister: Troop Cuts Require 'Mobilization of All Forces'

AU2802160689 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
25 Feb 89 p 8

[CTK report: "From the Order of the Day by the Minister of National Defense"]

[Text] Prague—Army General Milan Václavík, CSSR minister of national defense, issued an order on the occasion of the 41st anniversary of the victory of the working people over reactionary forces in February 1948. Among other things, he stated in it:

We remember the victory of the working people over reactionary forces in February 1948 as a historic milestone in the development of our society. By the resolution of the question of state power in favor of the working class and the working people 41 years ago, the era of the exploitative-capitalist social order was definitively ended in our country.

During the entire period from February 1948 the Communist Party has strived to ensure the defense of the state and the power of the working class. It constructed a modern socialist army, one dedicated to the party and the people, and one completely reliant on the experience and assistance of the Soviet Army and on international cooperation with the other armies of the Warsaw Pact member states.

To continue under the present conditions in the achievement of February means to also fight for the enforcement of the new political thinking in the solution to international questions.

Contemporary measures in reducing the number of personnel, arms, and in the introduction of organizational changes in the Czechoslovak People's Army [CSLA] are being pursued unilaterally as the CSSR's concrete contribution to improving trust and security in Europe. These, however, do not mean a lowering of demands. On the contrary, the mobilization of all forces is necessary so that the security of the state and our socialist society is fully guaranteed despite these measures.

In harmony with the defensive character of the Warsaw Pact member states' military doctrine, we will therefore strengthen the combat readiness of the CSLA. We will consistently intensify cooperation with the Soviet Army and the other armies of the Warsaw Pact member states for the protection of peace and socialism.

NATO Stance for CFE Talks Criticized

*LD0503225889 Prague CTK in English
1826 GMT 5 Mar 89*

[By Jaroslav Prusek]

[Text] Brussels March 5 (CTK)—Talks on conventional disarmament in Europe opening in Vienna tomorrow will require a lot of good will of both sides.

The basic intention of both sides, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member states, is identical as expressed in the final document of the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—to strengthen stability and security from the Atlantic to the Urals. The roads to attain this goal differ in many aspects and considerable effort will be needed to bring them closer and adopt concrete measures.

NATO is coming to Vienna with a program indicated in a statement on arms control in the conventional sphere from the December session of the NATO Council in Brussels. Its main aim is reduction of the number of weapons in which the Warsaw Treaty has, according to NATO, superiority over NATO, i.e. tanks, guns and armoured vehicles. On the other hand, NATO refuses to include in the first stage of the Vienna talks aircraft and navy in which it has considerable superiority over the Warsaw Treaty, claiming that these types of weapons are so mobile that it will be very difficult to set effective regulations for the verification of their numbers.

As for the parallel forum of the 35 participants in the talks on measures to strengthen confidence and security in Europe, the NATO member states approach it with a joint and at first sight a very realistic program. Firstly they want to seek an agreement on greater openness in the exchange of information on armed forces and armament, their deployment and plans for introduction of new arms systems.

Secondly they want to deepen the conclusion of the Stockholm conference and demand notification of smaller military exercises before their start, invitation of observers and creation of better conditions for them.

The third set of proposals concerns better mutual contacts. NATO wants to seek organization of joint seminars on military conceptions of the two sides, creation of identical conditions for the work of journalists, etc.

These stands are essentially identical with the views of the socialist countries on steps to be taken in the strengthening of confidence and security in Europe. NATO official representatives proclaim their readiness to deepen mutual understanding and strengthen security on the European Continent. However, these words must be supported by a realistic approach to the talks on reducing the armed forces and armament with the aim to ensure step by step complete disarmament.

Foreign Minister Johannes Departs for CFE, CSCE Talks in Vienna

*LD0503180789 Prague CTK in English
1612 GMT 5 Mar 89*

[Text] Prague March 5 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jaromir Johannes left here for Vienna today.

In the Austrian capital he will attend the opening of talks of 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO states on conventional armed forces in Europe and talks of 35 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on measures to strengthen confidence and security on the continent.

The opening of the talks will take place at the level of foreign ministers of the Helsinki Final Act signatories.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Editorial on Baker's NATO Tour To Urge SNF Modernization

*AU1702165189 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 16 Feb 89 p 2*

[Editorial by "W.M.": "My Shirt is Close, But My Skin is Closer"]

[Text] The new U.S. secretary of state, James Baker, established contacts with the U.S. allies by touring the capitals of the West European NATO countries. Shortly after Baker had left Washington, the White House spokesman said that the administration will not have defined its

foreign and security policy position before May. So, even though it has not been decided what priorities the new U.S. Administration will set, and even though Baker himself, concerning the purpose of his trip, said that he intends to ask the allies' advice and opinion, he obviously adopted a different position during the talks.

At any rate, according to reports from Oslo and Copenhagen, where the visitor paid lightning visits, Baker emphatically stressed the necessity of "modernization" of the short-range missiles deployed in West Europe. However, the governments of these countries, in agreement with their citizens, reportedly said that they are opposed to this. The Danish Government reportedly recommended to the new U.S. Secretary of State not to play up this issue, which is a controversial one in the alliance.

However, Baker did just that on the next leg of his trip—in Bonn. Even though official statements said that there was agreement between both sides that NATO should submit an overall disarmament and arms control concept at its summit meeting this spring, this agreement cannot have been worth a lot. Shortly before the visitor from Washington arrived, an official statement said that the Federal Government would not make its basic decision on the "modernization" of the ground-based Lance missiles before 1991-92, because only then would a "real decision" be necessary. Of course, nobody can fail to see that the date mentioned is after the next Bundestag elections in which the citizens, two-thirds of which are opposed to nuclear missiles, will decide on a new federal government. According to DIE WELT, this position has really made the visitor from the United States "feel insecure." He made the experience that, even for best friends, one's shirt is close, but one's skin is closer.

Back in Washington, Baker hopefully will report in detail on the results of his exploratory talks, which hopefully will be properly reflected in the definition of the U.S. foreign and security policy position. The European peoples—in the East and in the West of the continent—do not want another arms race or a "modernization" of means of mass destruction. The overwhelming majority of them do not want to have nuclear weapons at all. The sense of achievement that Baker had in Turkey cannot delude anybody. The Turkish Government supported his urge for "modernization."

Commentary Criticizes U.S. Space Weapons Program

AU2302152089 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 17 Feb 89 p 2

[“ng” commentary: “Has SDI Been Abandoned?”]

[Text] Readers are asking whether the SDI program has now been abandoned. Of course not. In his first speech to Congress, U.S. President George Bush stated: “I will continue to pursue SDI.” In the same speech, he announced that he will “carefully” reconsider the foreign and security policy of his country.

In other words: The reconsideration, which will probably be concluded at the beginning of May, is to bring final clarification as to the extent to which Washington will proceed with plans to militarize space. Then we will learn when and how negotiations on the 50-percent reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear potentials, with strict adherence to the ABM Treaty, will be continued. According to original plans, another round was to have started in Geneva on 15 February.

As the WALL STREET JOURNAL reported recently, Reagan's dream about a “star wars” system, which would make the United States invulnerable to intercontinental nuclear missiles, has meanwhile been abandoned as “unrealistic.” During the past 6 years, \$15 billion were wasted on this project. It has mainly been supported by enterprises that specialize in space technology and electronics companies, scientific institutions, and politicians, military experts, and mass media that are affiliated with these firms.

This “space mafia” is exerting twofold pressure on the administration. On the one hand, it wants to test the newly developed exotic weapons directly in space, which is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty concluded with the USSR in 1972. On the other hand, with such spectacular tests it hopes to increase the administration's willingness to provide further enormous sums for the project. In addition to that, it continues to stick to its course aimed at the quickest possible deployment of a space-based, “imperfect” antiballistic missile system. Planning experts in the Pentagon expect the first stage to be completed in the middle of the nineties, which would include about 150 killer satellites and 3,000 interceptor missiles. Estimated costs: \$63 billion.

Washington is still far from abandoning the dangerous project aimed at extending the arms race to space. The Bush administration must now decide whether a curtailed program justifies continued enormous investments in the “star wars” program, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, pointed out.

Editorial Criticizes FRG Defense Minister on CFE Stance

AU2402200489 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 22 Feb 89 p 2

[Editorial by “Hue”: “Criteria of Comparison”]

[Text] Figures concerning the comparison of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been on the table for 3 weeks. The statement of the Defense Ministers Committee of the socialist military coalition, which now is an official UN document, is known to show an approximate parity regarding the ratio of arms and forces in Europe. Nothing is left of the West's much-cited story about the Warsaw Pact's excessive superiority.

FRG Defense Minister Scholz, who has used this thesis ad nauseam, now claims that the point is "not just the problem of directly effective tanks against tanks, aircraft against aircraft, but the point is qualities."

Well, let us consider the quality: The quality of the threat consists for the Warsaw Pact states in NATO's capacity to launch a conventional and nuclear surprise attack by its armored infantry, its offensive air forces in which NATO is superior, and its strong naval formations in the Mediterranean and in the North Atlantic. That has been rehearsed for years particularly in the "Autumn Forge" large-scale maneuvers, as well as in the Europe-wide secret "Wintex-Cimex" command post exercises that begin in 3 days. In addition, aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean or missile-equipped cruisers in the Atlantic have weapons systems the purpose of which is not only the declared protection of supply lines.

A qualitative threat also emanates from the practice of permanent and unrestricted low-altitude flights which only make sense if their purpose is practicing an attack against the socialist states, as well as, of course, from the insistence on nuclear weapons, which has been corroborated in recent days. It is very unlikely that they will be used on NATO's own territory.

We do not hear NATO circles considering cuts in these qualities of NATO, comparable, for example, to a strict orientation toward defense structures according to the Warsaw Pact model. On the contrary: Plans are being pursued to modernize all types of offensive and first-strike weapons, be it new KOLAS [complementary air defense system] missiles or multiple launch rocket systems which can also be equipped with nuclear warheads, both with ranges of less than 500 kilometers.

To justify this, Scholz again resorts to untruthful statements: He said that the Soviet Union's military doctrine which "requires such a degree of military strength that one must always be capable to totally defeat the enemy on his own territory," must be overcome.

A defense minister should be expected to have expertise as a minimum prerequisite for his office. Almost 2 years ago, the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine was formulated. It demands the prevention of war as its objective. It demands that the Warsaw Pact states never and under no circumstances start military acts against a given country or an alliance of countries, and that they never be the first to use nuclear weapons. Defense is a principle. Weapons systems and structures must suffice to prevent a surprise attack and even make every attack hopeless. It will be organized in a way that any aggressor who were to succeed in entering our territory will be totally defeated.

However, Mr Scholz obviously cannot get along without imputations, so as to preserve enemy images in the FRG, justify armaments, and inhibit disarmament.

NATO Command Exercise, New FRG Wartime Recruitment Law Assailed

'Annual Saber Rattling'

AU0203165289 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 28 Feb 89 p 2

[*"He."* article: "War Plans and Unemployment"]

[Text] In the framework of the command post exercise "Wintex-Cimex'89," NATO is at present exercising the alliance's ability to carry out a nuclear first strike at the countries of socialism. We pointed out the anachronistic nature of this annual saber rattling in the same column of this paper in yesterday's edition. In the meantime, a new aspect of militarization and war preparations in the FRG has become public. While Bonn's political leadership has established itself as "war cabinet" in its nuclear-blast-proof bunker in the Ahr Valley and is rehearsing the aggressive NATO scenario, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU reports that the FRG Government issued a decree on 25 January regulating "how in the case of war or crisis, workers, particularly unemployed people, have to be recruited by force." A spokesman of the FRG Labor Ministry said that this decree is an implementing regulation for the "Work Guarantee Law," which was adopted in 1968 as part of the so-called emergency laws.

One has to ask oneself whether those who initiated this new decree are still in their right mind. In 1989, a time in which disarmament steps have been initiated and in which all governments have been requested to further proceed along this road and make constructive contributions toward peace, precisely at such a time people are picking up "laws" of state terrorism and of the preparation of war that are a relic of the era of the Cold War. The military-bureaucratic machinery continues to work as if nothing had happened.

Moreover, the project is utterly perfidious. Would not a crisis, a period of tension, including the case of war, be quite useful so that one could get rid of the problem of millions of unemployed? The necessary "stages" have been provided for: Initially, the labor exchange finds the unemployed jobs in "enterprises crucial in the case of war," such as arms and supply industries, later there will simply be "enforced recruitment."

One cannot help recalling that once before a "gigantic job-creation program" was directly used for the preparation of a war of aggression that emanated from German soil. To abolish unemployment not on the road of social justice, but on the road of a military arms race, which would result in a critical development of the situation—is this what they want? Is the sad fate of the unemployed to become even sadder by turning them into slaves of the arms industry and ultimately into cannon fodder?

'Practicing for Total War'

AU0103144989 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 27 Feb 89 p 2

["r.e." article: "NATO Is Practicing the Total War"]

[Text] Just in time before the beginning of the Vienna disarmament talks, NATO is practicing total war. On Friday [24 February], the command post exercise, "Wintex-Cimex '89" began, which will last until 9 March and which tests the alliance's ability to carry out a nuclear first strike against the countries of socialism. This exercise, which is being held for the 10th time, and in the course of which 25 nuclear strikes will be simulated, has among its goals the testing of the civil authorities concerning its functioning both in the case of war and in the case of tension, and to derive the corresponding measures from it.

The peace movements in the NATO countries have called for actions against Wintex-Cimex. They describe the maneuver as anachronistic, especially in view of the current great opportunity to take important steps toward averting the danger of war involving the use of several types of weapons. Especially now, they say, a further militarization of the social life in the NATO states is particularly absurd.

This is a view that is gaining more and more support. Greece and France do not participate in this NATO maneuver. Even in the FRG all Laender do not fully participate in it any more. In addition to Saarland and Bremen, SPD-governed Schleswig-Holstein has now also declared that it "will not pursue any goals in the exercise, but will only react to requests by other authorities." As has been learned from Bremen "those in charge of supplying information" are only sometimes available during office hours.

Questions are likely to be raised from that bunker in the Ahr Valley, which has been described as nuclear-blast-proof and to which Bonn's political leadership retreats as the so-called practice cabinet, sometimes also referred to as war cabinet in order to rehearse the scenario of a nuclear war—allegedly in the interest of the population—even including the safeguarding of the transport of the dead; in order to practice the emergency laws, which are a relic from the era of the cold war; and in order to prove the "necessity" for bringing the nuclear weapons that are deployed in the FRG up to date, in other words, to "modernize" them.

What is this militant attitude all about? The real danger, as has been proved by Wintex-Cimex, emanates from NATO itself; from its efforts to newly stimulate the arms race; from new arms projects such as the KOLAS missiles, the Fighter 90, and the "modernization" of the "Lance" missiles. The actions against Wintex-Cimex by many citizens in some 120 cities and communities show that more and more people have become aware of this.

Defense Minister Calls for 'Positive Input from Both Sides' on Disarmament

LD0103002489 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1820 GMT 28 Feb 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The founding vow of the GDR and the guiding thought for the creation of the National People's Army [NVA] was to do everything for the maintenance and development of peace and good neighborliness within the European family of nations, GDR Defense Minister Army General Heinz Kessler, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo, reasserted today during a reception for military and defense attaches accredited to the GDR on the occasion of the 33d NVA anniversary.

The latest peace initiatives by the Soviet Union, the GDR, and the other socialist states were described by Heinz Kessler as important prior concessions for comprehensive disarmament. The world public and the public of the GDR, too, expects similar signs of goodwill by NATO. "The process of disarmament and detente requires positive input from both sides if it is to be lasting."

The minister gave an assurance that the NVA is deeply conscious of its particular responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security in Europe. Pointing to the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR this year and the unleashing of two world wars—with fateful consequences for the peoples—75 and 50 years ago, respectively, with their anniversaries falling in 1989, Kessler stressed that since the smashing of fascism the firm will has been repeatedly announced that never again will war emanate from German soil.

Chief of Staff: Cuts To Exclude 'Far-Reaching Offensive Operations'

LD0103093589 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 0359 GMT 1 Mar 89

[Excerpts] Berlin (ADN)—In 1956 an army was formed with the founding of the National People's Army [NVA]. This was the first time in the history of the German people that their army embodied their progressive military traditions, the revolutionary working class, and their internationalist fight against imperialism and fascism and for democracy and socialism in particular. Colonel General Fritz Streletz, deputy defense minister and chief of the NVA Main Staff, stated this in an interview with the paper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 33d anniversary of the GDR Armed Forces. [passage omitted]

Colonel General Streletz went on to explain to what extent the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, the CSSR, and Poland are reducing their forces. He also assessed the initiatives of the socialist countries as a significant contribution to the disarmament process. "We hope that they will give other European states a stimulus worthy of consideration for their own steps toward reducing their military potentials," he said.

"Thus, as a whole, the strength and structure of our forces will change step by step in such a way that they will suffice for defensive operations but will not be suitable for far-reaching offensive operations. With this aim we have begun to reduce the number and scale of our troop exercises. In all these measures we take into account the fact that NATO continues to cling to its aggressive concepts by constantly maintaining a high degree of defensive readiness." [passage omitted]

Chief of Staff Streletz Interviewed on Troop Cuts, Defensive Doctrine

Army Anniversary Interview

AU0303174389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 1 Mar 89 p 3

[Interview with Colonel General Fritz Streletz, "deputy defense minister, chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army, secretary of the National Defense Council, and member of the SED Central Committee," by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reporter Rainer Funke: "On the 33d Anniversary of the National People's Army: Armed Forces—Pledged to the People and to Peace"; date, place not given]

[Text]

[Funke] Today, 33 years ago the National People's Army [NVA] was founded. What was the assignment of the GDR Armed Forces when they were founded?

[Streletz] On 18 January 1956, the GDR People's Chamber passed the "Law on the Establishment of the NVA and the Ministry of National Defense." This countered the dangers that had developed because of the FRG's integration in the NATO military pact and the establishment of the Bundeswehr. From that day onward, the protection of the GDR and its achievements has been carried out by a reliable army that is loyal to the workers class and its party and is firmly rooted in the Joint Armed Forces of the socialist defense alliance.

The NVA received the responsible task to protect the socialist system and the peaceful life of our citizens against any enemy and to ensure the sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability of the borders, and the security of the GDR in firm comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet Army and other fraternal armies as well as in close cooperation with all protective and security organs.

Military Doctrine Against War

On 1 March 1956, the staffs of the military districts, of the air forces and air defense forces, as well as the naval forces, established their ability to act. Thus, an important partial goal in the establishment of the NVA was achieved. Since then, 1 March has been celebrated as the day of the NVA.

With the NVA, for the first time in the history of the German people, an army was established that represents the progressive military traditions of the German people,

in particular of the revolutionary workers movement and its internationalist struggle against imperialism and fascism, for democracy and socialism. It knows "only one military doctrine," as Erich Honecker noted in his autobiography "From My Life," "to preserve peace, to do everything to prevent a war of aggression."

At the same time, this corresponded to the priority pledge which was made by our socialist worker-peasant state in the hour of its founding 40 years ago and which has always been loyally fulfilled since then: to do everything so that war will never again start from German soil. During the 33 years of its existence, the NVA of the GDR has always honorably fulfilled its assignment as an army of the people—to safeguard peace and socialism.

[Funke] Proceeding from the peace assignment of the Warsaw Pact, the fraternal socialist countries announced reductions of their armed forces and armaments. In this connection, readers have asked about the meaning of our advance unilateral moves.

[Streletz] The USSR, the GDR, and the other Warsaw Pact states made the decisions about the well-known unilateral reductions of troops, weapons, and defense budgets in full agreement with the principle of defense sufficiency, which is set down in the joint military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states. The unilateral reductions of their armed forces decided by the individual Warsaw Pact states are considerable.

Thus, the personnel strength of the Soviet Army alone will be reduced by 500,000 men. This is about 12 percent of its current overall strength, which corresponds to the number of active soldiers in the FRG Bundeswehr.

At the same time, the Soviet Union will reduce the amount of armament of its Armed Forces in the European part of the Soviet Union and on the territories of the GDR, Hungary, the CSSR, and Poland by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat planes. Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR will reduce their armed forces by more than 80,000 men in total, which corresponds to the strength of the British forces stationed on FRG territory.

In addition, more than 2,700 tanks and more than 200 combat planes, as well as a considerable number of other military equipment will be withdrawn from the armed forces of these fraternal countries. The NVA of the GDR will reduce its personnel by 10,000 men by the end of 1990, which corresponds to about 6 percent of its current personnel strength.

These initiatives of the fraternal socialist countries are an important contribution to the disarmament process. We hope that they will provide to other European states a suggestion worth thinking about for their own steps to reduce their military potentials.

[Funke] When will the NVA start to put its unilateral steps into practice?

[Streletz] As of May the 600 tanks of the NVA that will be eliminated will be used for other purposes in the national economy or will be scrapped. In brown coal open-pit mines, for instance, the chassis of the tanks could be used as traction mechanism, and track shifters or crane vehicles could be re-equipped. As of the end of April 1989, we will gradually start to disband the six tank regiments, and we will conclude this by the end of this year. Further details will be published when the occasion arises.

[Funke] With the reduction measures the GDR National Defense Council has also set down that the NVA will receive an even stronger defensive character. What does this mean?

[Streletz] The common defense doctrine of our alliance, which was decided by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states in May 1987, poses two principled tasks to the armed forces—two tasks which form a unity, namely to prevent any war and to protect and defend socialism. In this it proceeds from three organically linked principles—to maintain the military balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO at the lowest possible level;

- to solve any international quarrels peacefully, without the use of military means; and
- to reduce the military potentials to an amount that is sufficient for defense.

Our Army's Structure Is Oriented Toward Defense

By implementing their common defense doctrine, the Armed Forces of the GDR and those of the other socialist states have entered a new stage of their development. In order to give the NVA an even stricter defensive character, the six tank regiments and one air squadron will be disbanded for instance.

The units of all military services, that is, of the ground forces, air forces and air defense forces, and the navy, will be oriented even more toward doing active defense work as regards their equipment with main kinds of arms and combat technology. Our motorized rifle units will, for instance, no longer have tank regiments.

Thus, in the future our armed forces will have

- fewer tanks, but more antitank equipment;
- fewer river-crossing equipment but more barrier facilities; and
- fewer combat planes but more anti-aircraft equipment.

In total, the strength and structure of our Armed Forces will gradually change in such a way that they are sufficient for defense actions but cannot be used for extensive attack operations. With the same goal we have also started to reduce the number and scope of our troop exercises.

In connection with all these measures we take into consideration that NATO continues to stick to its aggressive concepts without a change and we, therefore, continuously maintain a high degree of defense readiness.

[Funke] The peace initiatives of the USSR, the GDR, and the other fraternal socialist countries have met with widespread agreement all over the world. Is it not now time that the FRG also shows goodwill and lives up with concrete deeds to its special responsibility, in particular at the sensitive dividing line between two social systems?

[Streletz] I think that such steps would correspond to the needs of the time, because they would contribute to the reduction of military confrontation and thus would not impair the FRG's security but increase it.

Concern About the Armament Course of the Bundeswehr

Unfortunately, the present development is going in another direction. I am thinking, for instance, of the fact that the FRG is the first NATO state to fix the plans for its armed forces practically until the year 2000, that the highest military budget to date—DM53.5 billion—has been approved for this year, that compulsory military service has been extended, that it supports the NATO plans for the modernization of its nuclear potential, and that the development of a new missile system KOLA has been started.

I would also like to mention the continual low-altitude flights of the FRG Air Force, the main purpose of which is—even according to statements by representatives of the Bundeswehr leadership—to practice the overcoming of our air defense system in order to carry out attacks in our hinterland. The FRG Bundeswehr is also playing an important role in the annual NATO autumn exercise series, during which NATO forces are sometimes operating in the immediate vicinity of the national border of the GDR and the CSSR.

All this causes us with concern. In our view, it does not show that the FRG intends to fulfill its pledge to do everything so that war will never again start from German soil with all consistency, a pledge that was made by Chancellor Helmut Kohl during Erich Honecker's official visit to the FRG in 1987.

The FRG Must Finally Follow With Deeds

It is high time that the ruling circles in the FRG turn with more goodwill toward the joint political initiatives worked out by the SED, CPCZ, and the SPD. This applies to our proposals

- for the establishment of a "chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe," which should encompass the territories of the GDR, the CSSR, and the FRG and in which any deployment, production, and use of chemical weapons would be prohibited;

- for the establishment of a "nuclear-free corridor in central Europe" of, at first, 150 km along the border line between the two alliance systems, which would considerably reduce the danger of a war of aggression; and
- for the establishment of a "zone of trust and security in central Europe," with which the military potentials capable of attack at the border line between the two military alliances could be shifted farther apart so as to reduce surprise attacks.

The implementation of these and other steps would be an important contribution to consolidating mutual trust and peace. We proceed from the premise that especially the two German states should be interested—more than any other state—in gradually reducing confrontation in the heart of Europe. The words of the FRG Government to create peace with ever fewer weapons must now finally be followed with deeds.

Interview with Austrian Paper

AU0703132189 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME
in German 7 Mar 89 p 8

["Exclusive interview" with Colonel General Fritz Streletz, deputy defense minister and chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army, by Erich Feichtinger in Berlin: "At the Border Line Between the Military Alliances"; date not given]

[Text]

[Feichtinger] Colonel General, prior to the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, the GDR announced reductions of its Armed Forces. What is the political and military significance of these reductions?

[Streletz] As you know, the military confrontation of the opposing military alliances is particularly dangerous in Europe, where there are enormous arms arsenals. Therefore, in the interest of eliminating the danger of war and of consolidating peace, we are in favor of drastic reductions of the Armed Forces and armaments.

In order to continue this process without a break after the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the Warsaw Pact states have decided to considerably reduce their conventional Armed Forces unilaterally and independent of negotiations.

[Feichtinger] This means a massive reduction of personnel and of the arms arsenal of the National People's Army [NVA].

[Streletz] Yes. At the decision of the GDR National Defense Council, the NVA will be reduced by 10,000 men by the end of 1990; this is about 6 percent of its current strength and corresponds to more than, for example, the current strength of the 16th Belgian Tank Infantry Division in the FRG. At the same time, six tank

regiments and one air squadron will be disbanded and 600 tanks and 50 combat aircraft will be taken out of service. The expenditure for national defense will be reduced by 10 percent.

[Feichtinger] If one reduces armaments, one might be accused of only throwing out junk. What will really be reduced?

[Streletz] The NVA is a relatively small army and, therefore, it cannot afford to have old technical equipment. We have relatively modern arms, and this is what we will reduce. The technical equipment which will be withdrawn will be taken out of the combat-ready units. Thus, when a tank regiment is disbanded the type of tanks which this regiment had will also be withdrawn. The tanks will either be reequipped for economic purposes or will be scrapped.

[Feichtinger] In connection with the reduction measures it was also announced that the NVA will be given a strictly defensive character. What does this mean?

[Streletz] In line with our joint defense doctrine, which was adopted by the Warsaw Pact states in Berlin in May 1987, it is our goal to gradually change the strength and structure of the Armed Forces of our alliance in such a way that they are sufficient for defense but are not suitable for extensive attack operations.

[Feichtinger] What is the concrete effect of this on the NVA?

[Streletz] In order to give the NVA an even stricter defensive character, its structure and equipment will be oriented mainly toward carrying out active defense operations. Our motorized rifle units, for instance, will not have any tank regiments in the future. In addition, we have started to reduce the number and scope of our troops exercises. More than 200 maneuver observers from the CSCE signatory states, among them also officers of the Austrian Army, have been able to convince themselves during six sets of maneuvers on GDR territory that the military activities carried out do not pose a threat to any other state.

[Feichtinger] You referred to the Warsaw Pact's defense doctrine. Will the military doctrine also be "adjusted" in this connection?

[Streletz] The goals and principles of the GDR military doctrine correspond completely to the joint military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact and, like it, it has a strictly defensive character. It is its supreme goal to do everything so that war will never again start from German soil.

The defensive character of the GDR military doctrine has always been reflected by its political side, because it corresponds to the nature of socialism to work for the preservation and consolidation of peace. At present, the GDR Armed Forces and all other Armies of the Warsaw

Pact states are working on implementing even more the military-technical side of the joint defense doctrine in the national military doctrines and in military practice.

[Feichtinger] Which role do the so-called hostile images play in the GDR and its Armed Forces in connection with what you have just said?

[Streletz] In their Berlin declaration on a joint military doctrine of May 1987 the Warsaw Pact states again stated clearly: "They do not consider any state or any people as their enemy." Our countries do not have any territorial claims toward their neighbors and do not intend to force their social system, and their concept of freedom and democracy on other peoples.

[Feichtinger] How does this affect a state which is in a special situation because of its location at the border line between the two military alliances and because of the existence of another German state?

[Streletz] The GDR cannot and must not overlook the fact that to the West of its national border there are influential forces, who, as our country's highest representative, Erich Honecker, stated, do not like the borders that developed as a result of World War II and of the postwar development.

Therefore, we consider it our duty to make our citizens and soldiers aware of the dangers that emanate from this for them, their lives, and for the achievements accomplished by our society through hard work and of what they can do against this with their work or during their service as soldiers. In our view, this problem will become less important to the extent to which it is possible—as a result of the disarmament negotiations—to gradually eliminate military confrontation on the European continent and strengthen mutual trust.

[Feichtinger] Colonel General, while we are sitting here and discussing disarmament and defensive military doctrines, in the FRG the first use of nuclear missiles is being tested. Does the Wintex-Cimex command post exercise not give a GDR officer food for thought?

[Streletz] If you studied our press, you will have noticed that we are paying a lot of attention to these problems because we think that these exercises that are carried out on FRG territory do not correspond to what the FRG Government keeps saying. These measures certainly do not help to build confidence and further strengthen security.

[Feichtinger] In addition to these exercises, the plans for modernizing the NATO nuclear arsenal are also causing concern. What is the GDR's reaction to this?

[Streletz] Like many people in the European countries, our citizens and soldiers are observing with great concern the NATO efforts to equip its Armed Forces with new and ever more perfect weapons and to undo the successes achieved in the field of disarmament of intermediate-range missiles. They do not understand that, in

view of the peace initiatives of the socialist countries and the forthcoming Vienna disarmament talks, as well as contrary to the demands of broad circles of the population, the disastrous arms race is being continued in the NATO states, and the FRG Government, for instance, rejects a renunciation of the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles.

[Feichtinger] Which way would you choose? Which possibilities would you propose for dealings between the FRG and the GDR?

[Streletz] Proceeding from the jointly set down view that war must never again start from German soil but only peace, Erich Honecker, the highest representative of the GDR, has made varied initiatives for the continuation of cooperation between the GDR and the FRG in the interest of the dynamic continuation of the process of detente and disarmament in Europe.

In this connection he has affirmed on many occasions that the GDR advocates without any reservations a nuclear-free corridor, a chemical-weapons-free zone, and a zone of trust and security in central Europe. We think that regional steps will help to bring about far-reaching agreements, because they increase trust and security and are appropriate for reducing the fear of being threatened.

[Feichtinger] What can the military officials do on both sides? How can they change their relationship?

[Streletz] The offer presented by the GDR Defense Minister, Army General Kessler, to hold talks with FRG Defense Minister Scholz on issues of mutual interest point in the same direction. We have good relations with the Austrian Army, and the Armed Forces of Sweden and Switzerland, for example. A lively exchange of delegations is taking place in this sphere.

So, why should this not be possible between the GDR and FRG? On the basis of the Stockholm document, there has been positive experience concerning the mutual observation of exercises between the two states, for example.

We, for our part, would consider it worthwhile to extend this to other spheres, by initiating talks between the chiefs of military services, for example. We are ready to start such talks without preconditions.

The invitation for Defense Minister Scholz is still valid. We hope that he will accept it one day because we see no reason why the two ministers should not discuss topical issues. Very often, it is easier to solve problems in personal discussions.

[Feichtinger] Apropos FRG: There have been strong protests among the population against low-altitude flights. What do you think of low-altitude flights?

[Streletz] In the GDR, all flights—no matter by whom they are carried out—are subject to the aviation law. Flights at altitudes of 70 or 80 meters—like those in the FRG—are

not permitted in our country. There is a certain noise pollution in the vicinity of airports because our planes must, of course, take off and land. If we carry out low-altitude flights at all, we do them along the Baltic Sea.

[Feichtinger] Colonel General, you mentioned relations with Austria, with the Austrian Army. What are they like?

[Streletz] Your country's neutrality, its role as a host to various disarmament forums, as well as the deployment of contingents of the Austrian Army in UN peace-keeping forces meet with respect in the GDR. The contacts between the armies of our two states are part of the overall good relations between our countries.

Due to the defensive character of our two armies, we have a lot in common. This finds its expression in, among other things, mutual visits on all levels. We are convinced that the contacts between the armies of our countries will be expanded in the interest of promoting confidence.

HUNGARY

Central Committee Secretary Fejti on 'Military Diplomatic Activity'

LD2502044189 Budapest MTI in English
2149 GMT 23 Feb 89

[Text] Budapest, February 23 (MTI)—"The HSWP is firmly against the Armed Forces' and bodies' being subjected to the fluctuations of daily politics...attacks against the Armed Forces and bodies should be rejected. The sober majority of society also shares this view," stressed Gyorgy Fejti, secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee, at a meeting of representatives of the garrison troops and military organizations of Szekesfeharvar on Thursday [23 February].

Discussing the future of the Army, Mr Fejti stressed that the changes that have taken place in international politics, military policy and military doctrines should be taken into consideration for the developments. "We are keen to see the success and earliest possible realization of the new international way of thinking and military philosophy highlighted by the name of Mr Gorbachev. Therefore, we shall also be more active in our military diplomatic activity," Mr Fejti stressed.

POLAND

Defense Minister Siwicki Queried on Military Structural Changes

LD2702181989 Warsaw Television Service
in Polish 1900 GMT 26 Feb 89

[Interview with Polish Defense Minister Florian Siwicki by editor Marek Baranski; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text]

[Baranski] At the beginning of January this year Army General Florian Siwicki, minister of National Defense, gave PAP an interview in which he discussed a plan for extensive changes in the Polish Army as a consequence of the defense doctrine adopted as well as the intention to considerably reduce defense expenditures. In that interview the minister also promised to report to the public more often on the Polish Army, on life in the Army. That is why I asked for this conversation.

[Siwicki] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.

[Baranski] General, it has been nearly 2 months. Can you tell us any more details of the planned structural changes in our Armed Forces?

[Siwicki] As is generally known, the military is an organization set up to perform strictly defined tasks connected with ensuring the state's security. By and large, the structure has always been, is, and will remain a function, on the one hand, of the extent to which the state and its defense are threatened and, on the other, of the state's economic resources as well as the principles of the binding war doctrine. These factors mean that the Polish Army has never been and will never be a permanent organization. We always try to react to changing conditions in order to meet the requirements of the real situation.

Taking into consideration favorable developments in the international situation—especially in the sphere of threats to the state and the growing peaceful trends in Europe—we have again taken up the process of restructuring our armed forces. I do not have to stress that Poland, like other Warsaw Pact states—is vitally interested in strengthening peaceful trends. Our concrete contribution to the current disarmament dialogue, to increasing trust between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, is to publish data on our Armed Forces and reduce the military potential and level of military expenditures. This is also a confirmation of the proposals included in the Jaruzelski Plan.

As I said in my January statement, the favorable trends in the international situation, as well as in the country's economic situation, make it possible at the same time inspire us to emphasize our defense doctrine. Starting with such an assessment, the National Defense Committee last November made the well-known decision on issues concerning defense and the Armed Forces. This decision is the basis for the intensive work now being done in the Defense Ministry's main offices. This work has resulted in a specific plan for changes in the Armed Forces. The main point can be briefly expressed as follows: to have exactly the capacity which is really indispensable, but at the same time to manage it better and more effectively. This is a principle which we have applied in our work for many years.

[Baranski] General, what specific changes can we expect? I understand that the Polish Army is entering a stage of intensive restructuring.

[Siwicki] Yes, but before I answer this question I would like to remind you that we are not just starting to reduce the Army now. In the past 2 years we have reduced the Army by 15,000 soldiers and many hundreds of units of military and technical equipment. As a result—this is also due to stricter economics—beginning in 1987 an opportunity emerged to also reduce defense expenditures in subsequent years.

However, to return to your question: At present, we are really starting a complex and very responsible 2-year reorganization of the Army. Another two divisions will be dismantled [rozformowane]: the 2d and the 15th Mechanized Divisions. The manning level of the 10th and 16th Armored Divisions will be fundamentally reduced. A new structure will be gradually introduced in all divisions. The organizational form and the military equipment will meet the requirements of modern defense activities.

We are also dismantling [rozformujemy] a dozen or so regiments of various kinds of forces, including armored, artillery, and air force regiments; simultaneously, more than 30 territorial defense, engineering and construction, and road and rail units will be transformed into civil defense formations.

I would like, sir, to take this opportunity to explain that those new civil defense formations will be carrying out production and service tasks, primarily for the national economy but also including the performance of services in hospitals.

Changes will also occur in the organizational system of military training; I mentioned this in January also. I will give an example: We are planning to combine the Academy of the General Staff of the Polish Army and Military Political Academy to create a National Defense Academy. The integration of some higher officer colleges with related educational programs is envisioned. Likewise, we intend to proceed in relation to warrant officer schools as well as centers of training for military specialists. The general number of colleges and centers will be reduced by one-third.

[Baranski] As I understand, General, you are talking about changes on the lower levels. What about the headquarters, the command centers, and the Army's plans?

[Siwicki] It is difficult to imagine that we could stop the reorganization at Warsaw's boundaries or at the front doors of the main institutions. In the process of explicit changes in the system of administration in the Armed Forces and the adaptation of its bodies to the new structure and size of the Armed Forces, the main institutions of the Defense Ministry as well as the command at the operational level will also be reduced and reorganized. An example which graphically illustrates this is, for example, the intention to merge the air defense and air force units into a single armed force. Restructuring, however, is not simply a mechanical reduction or the

liquidation of specific centers; it is also far-reaching changes in the system and forms of commanding and directing the armed forces, particularly in computerization; a shortening of the information circuit; and radical reductions in reporting, record keeping, and other bureaucratic functions from which unfortunately the Army is also not free.

[Baranski] General, you mentioned that these changes will take place within 2 years. Therefore, I have some more questions: Why precisely 2 years? Second, since the defense minister gives a 2-year time limit, this means that he has a timetable.

[Siwicki] These questions are quite justified. In making the decision on the dismantling [rozformowanie] of military units, we took into account all circumstances, possibilities, and consequences. Please note that a regiment is not only a lot of varied armaments, military equipment, barrack compounds, and other material assets. It is above all people, particularly the highly qualified professional cadre. Time is also indispensable for relocating staff so that professional expertise will be put to the best possible use. We must also perceive the need for dealing with family problems connected with relocating or taking new jobs. Apart from this, we are creating conditions for the harmonious management of technology, both in the Army and in the national economy, and the optimal exploitation of buildings freed for other uses.

Regarding the timetable of activity, well in the upcoming period, that is on 3 and 4 March—of this year, of course—two armored regiments, a brigade of operational and tactical missiles, a mechanized training regiment, and several other units will be dismantled. I invite representatives of the mass media; I invite you, sir...

[Baranski, interrupting] Thank you very much.

[Siwicki] ...and also representatives of the defense attaché corps accredited to Poland so that you can convince yourselves of the credibility of our actions on the spot, the place where the units will be dismantled.

[Baranski] What results will this reorganization carried out in the next 2 years bring?

[Siwicki] The results will be significant and maybe even great. That is how I would like to describe it. Our Armed Forces will be decreased during this period by 40,000 soldiers; around 850 tanks, 900 cannons and mortars, 700 armored personnel carriers, 80 combat planes, many various types of military technology will be withdrawn. This is quite a lot and you could probably even say it is very great, insofar as I evaluate this. On the other hand, I am interested in what the possibilities are for using this equipment in the national economy. This is a complicated problem. We will be guided by the principle that nothing may be wasted. Some of the technology of the dissolved and reorganized units will be passed on to other units and sub-units. In this way we will reduce the

demand for new items. Most of the equipment, the most worn out, will be scrapped and after the removal of usable sub-assemblies will be given to the steel industry. A significant part will find its way into the national economy.

I can imagine a series of possibilities arising here. We are examining them and thinking that our Army and civilian specialists will find the most efficient and beneficial solutions for the national economy. This, of course, applies to specialized equipment. On the other hand, there is no problem with the various kinds of vehicles. We operate repair workshops that will, via limited tenders, be made available mainly to farmers. It is a fact that several dozen planes of the older generation, after their weapons were removed, were sold last year to the payments zone [hard currency] for nonmilitary purposes; that is what I presume. Simultaneously, the Army (?can sell) a tank, (?and albeit) in small measure, supplement the state budget with hard currency.

[Baranski] These changes that you speak of will create opportunities to use the free productive capacities in the defense industry. What are these opportunities?

[Siwicki] I would like to once more recall that the defense industry in Poland is not at the disposal of the defense minister but of the industry minister. For my part, I can only report that we have reduced orders for military equipment; in fact, we will allow part of the productive capacity in defense industry enterprises to be reoriented toward producing goods needed by the market and the national economy.

The defense industry has good—I would even say excellent—technical personnel and by its nature has at its disposal many modern technologies and has a high degree of technological discipline; in other words it stands for high quality production. I think that these factors are good grounds for using the freed production capacities in the national economy, improving market supplies, and making us feel more satisfied. This is not,

however, a simple matter; it will require time-consuming technical processes and organizational activities in many spheres, but I think that all this will be coped with by our efficient cadres.

[Baranski] General, a final question which I have to ask you as defense minister. Our historical experience is tragic. Will the restructuring of the Army, as mentioned by you, not affect Poland's defense capabilities?

[Siwicki] This is a good question; such fears could arise. We know well that although the threat to peace is decreasing, nevertheless it still exists. I mentioned at the beginning that military potential is the result of the real and predicted international situation. We remember this when making any decisions about structural changes in our Armed Forces.

Apart from that, we will maintain armies in such numbers and we will ensure they have such equipment as will really be indispensable at a given stage to guarantee Poland's security in the framework of the allies defensive system of the Warsaw Pact. Apart from that, does "less" have to mean only worse and weaker? Less today and in the future, in military service and on guard, should and will mean more efficiently, more effectively, more economically.

[Baranski] Thank you very much for this interview.

[Siwicki] Thank you.

Opole 13th Tank Regiment To Be Disbanded

*LD0203080289 Warsaw Television Service in Polish
1500 GMT 1 Mar 89*

[Text] Warsaw Pact countries are reducing the troop strength of their armies and a number of weapons. The so-called disbandment also concerns the 10th Sudety Armored Division in Opole. The 13th tank regiment of the division is to be disbanded. In this connection, a solemn assembly will be held on Saturday that will be attended by 14 military attaches from various countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and Korea [not further specified].

SDI's 'Defensive' Character Denied

52000027 Moscow: ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 89 p 31

[Article by Major General V. Belous, candidate of technical sciences: "Space in the Pentagon's Plans"]

[Text] A good deal has been said and written about "Star Wars." The extensive publicity campaign undertaken in the West in support of SDI is directed toward assuring the public of the peaceful nature of the "starry" brainchild of the American militarists. They say they are speaking only about protection from the Soviet nuclear missile threat.

But a dispassionate analysis of the design and structure of the antimissile defense system that is being developed as well as the weapons that are to be sent into orbit in space in the future clearly refute the arguments of the Pentagon advocates.

SDI is nothing more than a word game. "Strategic"—yes, "initiative"—undoubtedly, but regarding "defense"—that is for the naive. In regard to the defensive nature of the SDI it is appropriate to recall the words of Friedrich Engels to the effect that if a shoe brush is categorized as a mammal this does not mean that it will grow mammary glands.

What are the goals of the SDI? Western observers note three main factors. The first goal of the U.S. military space program consists in the desire to gain decisive strategic military superiority over the Soviet Union. To be the first to push the button has been the cherished dream of the Pentagon throughout the nuclear age. Only the prospect of dying does not suit them. They might as well be second. Therefore an impenetrable antinuclear "shield" is necessary to repel the counterattack from the USSR which is weakened after the sudden blow. To be sure, in the age of "new political thinking" there has been a re-evaluation of previous concepts for conducting nuclear war. In a joint high-level announcement in Moscow it was emphasized that in nuclear war there can be no winners and that it must never be started. The high-level parties also affirmed "their resolve to prevent nuclear between the Soviet Union and the United States—whether it be nuclear or conventional."

But it is not easy to stop the pendulum of the arms race. The production of material means of conducting warfare is continuing. The second task of SDI, which will most likely remain an important factor in the foreign and domestic policy of the U.S. ruling circles, is to provide an immense amount of steady profit for the arms manufacturers and the military-industrial complex, that "state within a state." Under the conditions in the United States, and in other imperialist countries as well, the arms race long ago became a well adjusted mechanism for redistributing the country's national wealth in favor of the powers that be. By using various military programs to take billions of dollars out of the pockets of the

citizens for "national security," they direct the flow of gold into the safes of the real masters of the Western world—the owners of large companies and banks.

Compare, for example, the cost of the future "Star Wars" system with that of the current models of arms. According to the authoritative opinion of an eminent American scientist, the Nobel prize winner H. Bethe, for one orbital station with laser equipment the tax payers will have to lay out from 5 to 10 billion dollars. In our day the construction of the atomic submarine Trident cost only (!) 2 billion and the shock atomic aircraft carrier Nimitz—almost 3.5 billion dollars. But the overall cost of the entire SDI program, according to the most modest calculations, is estimated at 1-2 trillion dollars. The drive for super-profit is explained by the desire of militaristic circles to move the arms race into space. Thus are formed the immense fortunes, about which even last century the great French writer H. Balzac said that behind each of them lies a crime.

The third factor is that they are counting on SDI to help drag the Soviet Union into an exhausting space arms race. They say that this will require immense military expenditure which will deal an appreciable blow to the Soviet economy. Certain U.S. circles are convinced that our country must lose in a decisive stage of the arms race and this will be a defeat of the USSR "before the first shot." The "hawks" of the military-industrial complex are openly calling for the Washington administration to unleash this kind of arms race in order to "arm the Russians to death."

The limited nature of such views is obvious. The leaders of our party and government have repeatedly announced that the Soviet Union is a resolute opponent of the militarization of space.

Recently the unrestrained optimism of "Star Wars" proponents in the United States has diminished somewhat. And it is not simply that Reagan, who stood by the cradle of the creation of the SDI, has left the White House. Even under the previous administration congress cut by almost 10 billion dollars the sum of expenditures earmarked for research within the framework of the SDI during the next 5 years.

Pragmatic Americans have begun to re-evaluate their values. Congressmen are also beginning to listen to the opinions of scholars and representatives of the public. And the conclusions of specialists are simple: SDI in the form in which it was conceived "will not be created in the foreseeable future." This is the conclusion reached by scientists who prepared a special 900-page report on assignment from the bureau of technological evaluations of the U.S. Congress.

On an order from the Pentagon a plan has been drawn up for the development of antimissile defense as early as the middle of the nineties which is based on the utilization of nuclear weapons. Here it is planned to destroy Soviet missiles in the startup section using 11,000 nuclear

interceptors located on 2,000 combat satellites. In the second echelon, which is intended for intercepting nuclear warheads at the end of the free flight section, they are to use 10,000 earth-based missiles. The third echelon of antimissile defense will have 3,000 earth-based interceptors that attack the target with fragments at low altitudes.

Speaking of the significance of the SDI, R. Reagan promised the U.S. population that it would create an impenetrable antinuclear "shield." In other words, he was speaking about creating the "absolute" weapon. But the history of war convincingly shows that an "absolute" weapon is as much of an absurdity as the "eternal" engine.

In his speeches M. S. Gorbachev has repeatedly emphasized that the SDI does not frighten us militarily and our response will be effective, although not at all what Washington expects. Responsive measures will depreciate the SDI.

The course of the development of international relations in the postwar period has been reflected in the conclusions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference: "The insurance of the safety of nations will increasingly shift from the sphere of relations of military potentials to the sphere of political interaction..." The Soviet Union has come out with a bold program for saving humankind from the threat of nuclear destruction and has filled it with concrete content. But the notorious SDI is a significant obstacle on the path to its implementation. The future will show whether the political and military leadership of the United States is able to reject this dangerous idea in favor of peace.

'First Strike' Role for U.S. B-2 Alleged

18010345a Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
10 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by A. Pokrovov: "To Where Will the B-2 Fly?"]

[Text] Aerial refueling has been carried out. Behind are hours of flight over the ocean; Europe is below. Early warning radar stations should notice the large airplane, with its widespread wings. But the radar screens are clear. There are only slight reflections of an unknown nature. This is the super-secret B-2 "Stealth" super-bomber. It is an invisible airplane. And it is flying to destroy the mobile missile launchers and strategic and tactical facilities of the presumed enemy.

It is true that so far the B-2 "Stealth" operates thus only on paper. But, only so far. As U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT states, the first test flight is planned for early 1989. The long years of developments behind the super-secret locks of U. S. Air Force laboratories and hangars cost the military department \$200 billion. The B-2 became the second aircraft, following the F-117A fighter, made with the use of "Stealth" technology, a technology for manufacturing aircraft that are difficult to intersect by radar.

The operating principle of modern radars was taken into account in creating the bomber. Their ground transmitter sends radio waves toward the aircraft, and a receiver at the same location fixes the beams reflected from the object, turning them into a picture on the radar screen. Aircraft from the "Stealth" family are designed so that radio waves are not reflected from their fuselages, but are absorbed, or directed away from the receiver. For this purpose, the "Stealth" is made out of non-metallic construction, with the use of epoxy resins. The surface of the fuselage is cellular, resembling honeycombs (such an outer casing absorbs waves, and does not reflect them). Moreover, fuel tanks and all weapons are not suspended, but are concealed beneath the skin of the bomber. It has accessories for protection against infrared tracking and guidance devices. The noise radiation and overall visibility of the bomber have been reduced.

The B-2 "Stealth" justifies its name, which in translation means "stealthy" (kradushchiysya). On the radar screen it looks like a large bird (eagle or heron). By comparison, a human figure is 100 times more noticeable, and a passenger jet aircraft 10,000 times so.

The U. S. military-industrial complex cannot conceal its satisfaction. A new spiral in the arms race is approaching, which they calculate will weaken the USSR, after the U. S. has plunged into the next hysteria of military expenditures. In order to create a new generation of radars, capable of "seeing" the B-2, the Soviet Union will require gigantic capital investments, and years of research. The Pentagon demands more and more funds for the B-2 project from the U. S. Congress, and has also obtained the approval of newly elected President George Bush. The estimated price of the innovation—\$500 million per plane (twice as much as the cost of the B-1-B strategic bomber, its predecessor)—does not frighten military industry officials, but gladdens them. Each F-117A "Stealth" fighter plane is also costly—\$100 million.

The Pentagon does not regret the monetary cost, assuring Americans that the B-2 is a defensive weapon, created to defend the U. S. from Soviet missiles. This is not a new slogan. The American military even calls the star wars program defensive. However, the same magazine, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, cites the opinion of American scientists, speaking in favor of curbing the arms race, who are convinced that the B-2 "Stealth" has been created exclusively to make a first strike against the USSR.

Nor was the moment at which the "hawks" removed the mantle of secrecy from the "bomber of the 21st century" accidental. The USSR and the United States, in accordance with the treaty, are destroying intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. A positive dialogue is underway, which is sowing hope and optimism in people, and the Pentagon again threateningly brandishes its weapons, demonstrating its novelty.

The military hopes that the new bird of prey will supplement the Pentagon menagerie, and become the next terrifying mythic weapon. However, the B-2 is not all that invulnerable. American specialists believe that the "Stealth" airplanes have one important shortcoming. They cannot orient themselves without assistance from the AWACS early warning system, for which Indigo-Lacrosse satellites serve as elements. (Such a satellite was placed in orbit by the space shuttle Atlantis.) What awaits the B-2, if its coordinators in space, for any reason, do not function? The helpless bombers will turn into useless, costly toys of the Pentagon generals, and hundreds of billions of dollars will be thrown to the winds to oblige the next military psychosis.

West Accused of 'Falsifying' Data on Soviet Chemical Weapons
AU2402091289 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
in Polish 21 Feb 89 p 3

[APN commentary "especially for ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI" by APN political commentator Spartak Beglov: "Chemical Weapons in the USSR—The West Is Falsifying Data"]

[Text] Yet another joint attempt to distort official Soviet data on the quantities of chemical weapons in USSR arsenals was recently made in London and Washington. First of all, the London TIMES, basing itself on anonymous government sources, described the Soviet figure of 50,000 tonnes as absurd and claimed that Soviet stockpiles actually amount to 300,000 tonnes. The paper also included in this total biological weapons, which the USSR does not possess at all.

The next day, William Burns, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, speaking in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, not only supported the accusations against the USSR whereby the Soviet

Union is concealing the actual figures on chemical- and biological-weapon stockpiles, but also said that even the quantities quoted by the London daily are major underestimates.

The relevant Soviet circles whom we asked for an explanation said that these accusations are nothing new. The Soviet side has already explained during negotiations that the data published by Moscow concerns the net weight of chemical substances, not the weight of shells or containers. It is clear that if one fails to calculate weapons quantities this way, one can then invent all kinds of figures and distort the real state of affairs.

As far as biological weapons are concerned, no source is in a position to provide any data on these weapons, for the simple reason that no such weapons exist in the Soviet Union. Moscow adheres closely to the 1972 convention that bans biological weapons.

Thus, conjectures like this are nothing new. However, the moment in time chosen by London and Washington is highly significant. New U.S. President G. Bush has said that a ban on chemical weapons is one of his priorities. Moscow has not only said that it is aiming for the same goal, but it has already traveled a certain distance along the road leading to it. Over the past 2 years, the USSR has published information about its chemical-weapon stockpiles and has decided to halt their production. The construction of a facility to destroy these weapons is nearing completion. Finally, as has already been announced, the USSR is eliminating its chemical weapons unilaterally, without waiting for an international convention to be signed. Moscow is also ready to permit on-site international inspections.

In a situation like this, the Americans have nothing that could consolidate the President's noble intentions. Hence the speculations meant to divert attention from the real state of affairs. In the meantime, Moscow is still waiting for Washington's first step—in other words, the publication of the quantities of U.S. chemical weapons.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Defense Minister Scholz on CFE Talks: Urges Assymetric Soviet Cuts

AU0603194189 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 6 Mar 89 p 13

[Article by Defense Minister Rupert Scholz: "On the Vienna Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces; 'The Side That Has More Has To Eliminate More'"]

[Text] Various expectations are connected with the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe which start today. They are not unfounded. However, if hopes are not to be based on illusions, the political reality of our time will have to be considered.

So far, the Soviet policy toward Western Europe has consistently been aimed at influence and predominance. One of its declared long-term goals was to terminate the United States' military presence in Europe, decisively reducing the United States' political influence in Europe in this way. This corresponds to a logic that can hardly be rejected: As long as two equal superpowers, which, moreover, are militarily capable of keeping each other in check and even of destroying each other, are confronting each other in Europe, both will not be able to influence the situation in the other superpower's sphere of power and to push through their own interests there. However, if one superpower (that is, the United States in Western Europe) retreats from its sphere of influence, no power will be there to confront the remaining one. Therefore, a Europeanization of the East-West conflict has always been in the Soviets' interest. For neither one of the West European states nor Western Europe as a whole is a match for the superpower Soviet Union—despite the number of inhabitants or economic figures.

On the one hand, this is because of the very different degrees of vulnerability. However, it is above all because of the gigantic military potential which the Soviet Union has accumulated in Europe, ranging from nuclear weapons of all sizes and ranges to oversized assault armies in very restricted areas—a potential which the West Europeans, with good reason, are neither ready nor able to balance with their own weapons.

Simply regarding the inconceivable Soviet military expenditure, which is valued at 15 to 17 percent of the gross social product (more than five times our expenditure, and there are many who think that ours is high), as arms madness or folly and, thus, relegating them to the sphere of irrationality means taking an all too easy way out.

No. This spending by the Soviets has been the result of a dispassionate consideration of targets and expenses. So far, the target has been to confront Western Europe with such a superior military potential that—because of political common sense and the instinct of self-preservation—nobody has dared to counter this potential. For in this case it is no longer necessary to risk war; then sabre

rattling is enough to break political resistance and implement one's own interests at pleasure—this is all the easier the greater one's own inviolability and the smaller the West Europeans' inviolability is. So far, all Western governments and all major political groups, not only in the North Atlantic Alliance, have agreed to this assessment. Today, even official voices from the Soviet Union confirm this assessment.

How Has the West Reacted to This Strategy?

It has never tried to draw level with the Eastern arsenal; neither internationally nor, least of all, in Europe. Relying on deterrence by nuclear weapons, it has only maintained the unrenouncable minimum of nuclear weapons to be able to resist limited military actions and political pressure.

However, as this minimum is already a heavy burden for our economies and cannot guarantee absolute security, the West has incessantly urged and demanded that military stability should be secured by a balance and the renunciation of strategic attack capability. For decades, the West specifically called for asymmetric disarmament measures, that is to say, the reduction of Eastern superiority. However, the East has turned a deaf ear to this and the Western public has sometimes paid too little attention to it.

Today, it is considered as proven that it would have been wrong to deal with the Soviet Union's ideas about "disarmament" which it presented before. In this case, the imbalance would have been pre-vented and Soviet superiority in Europe would have been established in a treaty. However, the internal situation in the Soviet Union has decisively changed now.

Over the decades an excessive arms policy deprived the Soviet state of all its means to invest in the fields of consumption and social issues, and caused an economic decline without resulting in the success of foreign policy goals. This understanding was at the root of the current reforms: If the current military spending is maintained it will be impossible to reform the Soviet economy. Thus, "new thinking" has led to a revision of foreign policy objectives, which had long been overdue, particularly vis-a-vis the United States: Security is no longer to be achieved by "strengthening the military power" or by "increasing the already gigantic defense spending." The former military doctrine is to be suspended. The West's predominant principle will now be recognized: "The security of one's own country cannot be guaranteed without taking account of the security interests of others."

We have every reason to carefully watch this change and pay tribute to its progress; Western and Soviet interests may come closer together. Thus, the time for assuming talks on stabilizing security in Europe has come, for there is no better condition for successful talks than mutual interest in achieving a result that had been defined beforehand. Until this was achieved, the West

was neither giving up hope nor waiting inactively. The members of our alliance have worked out a negotiation offer through which the basic problems of European security may be solved and which will guarantee the justified interests of both the two sides and the individual member states.

What Is the Basic Problem of European Security?

It is the antagonistic interests of the East and West, which have continued to exist to this day, and in the superpower Soviet Union's claim for hegemony and consequently its excessive, primarily conventional military superiority in Europe; a superiority which we cannot accept even if its aggressive character was to change.

The qualification "conventional" can be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union in its double role as a superpower has been ready for a long time to control its nuclear potential compared to the other superpower, the United States, on a more or less equal level and for individual systems that have been agreed upon. It was in the USSR's interest to have clear parity, because thus it could limit its expenditure without losing leeway in Europe.

Yet, conventional stability has so far not been in the USSR's interest, which was proven by the failure of the Vienna Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, which were suspended recently. However, we must not get discouraged by this. After all, the Western alliance has developed a plan for negotiations with which we can approach the talks with optimism. We are firmly convinced that this plan does justice to the interests of both sides.

Therefore, these negotiations, which will be protracted and are bound to suffer certain setbacks, call for an even more realistic view of the situation. Excessive hopes for the near future are unjustified, and competing to see who comes up with the most spectacular gestures outside the negotiation forum would be as disastrous as the attempts of individual nations to go it alone for motives that are based on domestic policy. It is true that the East has sent a positive signal when it announced late last year that it will unilaterally reduce troops and weapons; however demands for immediate reciprocating steps are inadequate. Even after it implements these announcements, the Warsaw Pact continues to have considerably more divisions, tanks, artillery, and aircraft than at the time when Brezhnev took power—and even at that time the West was already at a numerical disadvantage and has never tried to catch up.

Here are some figures: When Brezhnev became general secretary, the Red Army had less than 3.3 million soldiers. It had 140 divisions with 35,000 tanks. At the end of his term—and to this day—there have been 5.5 million Soviet soldiers and 208 divisions with more than 50,000 tanks. If now, the forces are to be reduced by 500,000 men, the remaining strength (not counting the

allies) is still far above the former level and markedly above the level of NATO forces in Europe (2.8 million soldiers, 102 divisions, and 18,000 tanks.)

Thus, talks on conventional security and stability in Europe are even more in our vital interest. For, if it is possible to implement the principles that have been developed by the West and to agree to the objectives that have also been defined by us, then security and stability are achievable. Never before were they as tangible as they are today. The principles include:

One's own security must not be sought at the expense of others.

Absolute military invulnerability promotes the readiness to take political risks and is thus a source of high instability.

Results and agreements must be mutually and objectively verifiable.

Reductions must not create the conditions for one side to achieve superiority in a field that is not part of the negotiations.

Our objectives include a course of action in the forthcoming Vienna talks that is neither original nor sensational, but instead even more reasonable:

To define and restrict the issue of the talks according to location, nature, and quantity. Those who want to achieve everything at once ask too much of themselves and of others. There is far-reaching agreement on this issue.

To achieve an equal level in the categories that have been agreed upon. The side that has more has to eliminate more. Considering the proven inferiority, unilateral actions by the West would threaten this process.

To reduce the achieved equal level to a lower level, which has to be agreed upon and which is below the current NATO level, is a primary goal.

To abolish or drastically reduce those means and procedures that may particularly serve the use of the armed forces in an offensive way.

The talks, which are now beginning, will be successful to the extent to which the USSR will give priority to reducing its astronomical arms spending and not to imperialistic objectives. There are a number of reasons, not least the USSR's readiness to adopt Western positions, that this will be the case.

However, there is still a long way to go. What is required is readiness for compromise, solidarity with the alliance, patience, a sense of proportion, and persistence toward the East.

We must not fall victim to any illusion: A world without weapons, interests, and conflict is not in sight. No result of any negotiations is able to change the fact that the USSR will remain a Eurasian superpower that pursues the policy of a superpower in Europe and thus maintains the means for power. It will be necessary in the future too, to take the necessary precautions for security, and, above all, to never forget what is necessary for real political detente. For, the existence of weapons is the result of political tension; the elimination or reduction of weapons does not automatically abolish tension or the reasons for tension.

Reaction to U.S. Plan To Remove Chemical Weapons Before 1992

Statement by Spokesman Ost

LD0603144789 Hamburg DPA in German
1403 GMT 6 Mar 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The United States intends to remove its chemical weapons stored in the FRG ahead of schedule and not wait until 1992. According to Government spokesman Freidhelm Ost, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker informed Chancellor Helmut Kohl of this in a telephone conversation. The Chancellor had welcomed this information "most strongly."

According to Ost, Baker intends to officially announce this on Monday at the conference on conventional disarmament of the foreign ministers of the 35 CSCE countries.

The then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan had assured Kohl in 1986 that chemical weapons would be withdrawn from the FRG by 1992. They are to be destroyed in the United States. Baker's telephone call to the chancellor took place on Saturday, Ost said.

Speaking to the press on Monday, Ost spoke of this as an "important sign" with regard to the FRG Government's strong desire to achieve a worldwide ban on chemical weapons before the end of this year.

Kohl Interviewed on Move

AU0603201189 Mainz ZDF Television Network
in German 1800 GMT 6 Mar 89

[Interview with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl by ZDF reporter Peter Ellgaard in Bonn on 6 March—recorded]

[Text] [Kohl] Permit me to remind you that at the 1986 World Economic Summit in Tokyo, President Ronald Reagan and I agreed on the United States withdrawing the chemical weapons that have been stored in the FRG by 1992. This was often doubted here. Now President Bush has ordered an examination of whether this withdrawal can take place—and I am adding this—before this deadline. I take it that this examination, which must take place for technical reasons, will be successful; and I do hope—I do not want to say any more now—that the chemical weapons will disappear from here before the

1992 deadline. This is an old desire of FRG policy. It means the fulfillment of a promise by our American friends. This step is unilateral and I hope that the other side, the USSR, will carry out this step in its sphere.

[Ellgaard] Mr Chancellor, it is well known that the Americans already have a new generation of chemical weapons, the so-called binary weapons, the deployment of which is still open. What about these?

[Kohl] I do not think this is a relevant topic for us. I do not intend to agree to the deployment of such weapons.

[Ellgaard] More generally, what do you think the chances are that a universal ban on chemical weapons will be agreed on this year?

[Kohl] I think there is a good chance for a universal ban on chemical weapons. However, I have doubts as to whether this will be possible within the remaining months of this year. What we can do, we as the FRG, as the FRG Government, I myself—we will do everything to make these weapons disappear, because we do not need them.

Kohl Comments Further

LD0603184889 Hamburg DPA in German
1809 GMT 6 Mar 89

[Excerpts] Bonn/Vienna (DPA)—Chancellor Helmut Kohl has welcomed the intention of U.S. President George Bush to withdraw the chemical weapons stationed in the FRG ahead of schedule. Prior to this, the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had announced at the conference of the foreign ministers of the 35 CSCE states in Vienna on Monday that Bush had issued instructions "to look for ways" to remove chemical weapons from the FRG ahead of schedule. [passage omitted]

The chancellor, who had been informed in a telephone call from Baker on Saturday evening about the announcement to be made in Vienna, made a statement calling on the Soviet Union to follow the U.S. example and to remove their chemical weapons from the frontline immediately and destroy them. They could thus demonstrate their declared readiness to make unilateral disarmament moves also in the field of chemical weapons. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Genscher Welcomes Plan

LD0703095189 Hamburg DPA in German
0924 GMT 7 Mar 89

[Excerpts] Vienna, (DPA)—Diplomats, military officials, and scientists from the 35 states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were invited Tuesday to a security and strategy conference to be held in the Federal Republic in June. Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher issued the invitation

Tuesday at a meeting of the CSCE foreign ministers in Vienna. The conference is to be held at the "Foundation for Politics and Science" in Ebenhausen, near Munich. [passage omitted]

The Bonn foreign minister asked that at the forthcoming Vienna disarmament negotiations a situation be created in which no state has more weapons at its disposal than are necessary for self-defense.

He welcomed the announcement by U.S. President George Bush yesterday that he will consider the speedy withdrawal of U.S. chemical weapons from the Federal Republic. Genscher said this was a "significant further unilateral" disarmament step.

CDU/CSU's Ruehe Urges USSR To Withdraw CW Arms from GDR, CSSR

LD0703101689 Hamburg DPA in German
0006 GMT 7 Mar 89

[Text] Hamburg. (DPA)—Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, appealed to the Soviet Union on Tuesday to spell out clearly when and to what extent it will withdraw and destroy its chemical weapons from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. In that way the Soviet Union could prove that it is prepared to make unilateral and specific contributions toward chemical-weapons disarmament and thus to a world-wide ban on this category of weapon, a Bundestag group statement says.

With the announcement by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to withdraw ahead of schedule chemical weapons deployed in the Federal Republic, the United States has shown its intention to achieve an early agreement on the world-wide elimination of all chemical weapons.

Partisan Reaction to U.S. CW Withdrawal Announcement Surveyed

AU0803174489 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 8 Mar 89 p 2

[Stephan-Andreas Casdorff report: "Ehmke Sees 'Little Reason for Joy'"]

[Text] Bonn, 7 March—The U.S. Administration's announcement that it is currently considering the withdrawal of its chemical weapons from the Federal Republic before 1992 has been assessed very differently in Bonn. Whereas Social Democratic Party (SPD) deputy floor leader Horst Ehmke sees "little reason for joy," because the deployment of new chemical weapons is being prepared, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Christian Democratic Union) [CDU] and Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] Bundestag floor leader Alfred Dregger spoke about a considerable success for the government. Helmut Schaefer (Free Democratic Party) [FDP], minister of state in the Foreign Ministry, described the announcement made by U.S. Secretary of State Baker as the

proper measure at the proper time, apt to lastingly influence favorably the climate of the Vienna conventional disarmament negotiations beginning on 9 March.

Ehmke, who is foreign policy spokesman of his party, complains that the withdrawal is by no means definitive. In addition, this is a unilateral announcement "that can be retracted at any time." According to Ehmke, this is what will really happen: "Obsolete poison grenades which constitute a danger to guard details and the people will—possibly—be withdrawn a bit earlier than 1992, and the deployment of new chemical weapons to be used in a crisis is already being prepared." He said that the pledge Bonn made to Washington—to have new binary chemical weapons deployed on German territory in a crisis—has been expressly confirmed by Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost. Ehmke said that he considered this "depressing." He said that describing this as chemical disarmament is "a cheat, as is describing intensified nuclear armament as modernization."

The Greens in the Bundestag also assessed Baker's announcement as "unsatisfactory." Alfred Mechtersheimer said that the statement does not rule out the deployment of new binary chemical weapons in Europe, as demanded by the U.S. Congress. The deputy asked the Federal Government to withdraw its approval of the stockpiling of chemical weapons on FRG territory, so as to prevent the deployment of new chemical weapons.

Alfred Dregger, in contrast, pointed out what credit goes to the CDU/CSU Bundestag group which is led by him, as well as the credit he can take regarding the agreement reached with the United States. Dregger said that in talks in 1985 with the then Secretary of Defense Weinberger he had been promised that the obsolete chemical weapons stored in Germany would be withdrawn when the United States started production of new binary systems, and the new weapons would not go to the Federal Republic in times of peace. He added that President Reagan confirmed this pledge in talks with Federal Chancellor Kohl during the World Economic Summit in Tokyo in 1986, and he also promised to withdraw the chemical weapons by 1992.

The floor leader assessed the intention of the new U.S. Administration under George Bush to "go beyond Reagan's pledge" and withdraw these weapons before 1992, as a "gesture of friendly affinity with the German people." Dregger said: "It shows that our U.S. allies are sensitive to, and take into account, German security interests, if they are articulated clearly and represented persistently."

Earlier, Kohl had emphasized his government's successes in the field of disarmament. The Federal chancellor stressed once again that by giving up the Pershing IAs, he made an important contribution to the current destruction of intermediate-range nuclear systems. Kohl said that regarding chemical weapons, the United States has now disproved all those who at the time had

expressed doubts about its word. He said that the United States has set an example which should be followed in kind by the Soviet Union and its allies.

Since the sixties, between 2,000 and 10,000 tons of highly poisonous U.S. ammunition have reportedly been stockpiled on German territory. It is not clear what condition this ammunition is in. The Defense Ministry claims that there is no danger for the people; however, the "Federal Association Against Poison Gas" has reported on leaks and corroded metal parts which make the removal of such weapons dangerous.

The United States has pursued plans since late in 1987 to build the binary "Big Eye" bomb and 155-mm artillery grenades. Moreover, the recent U.S. defense draft budget shows that Washington also intends to procure additional new chemical weapons. Reportedly they are warheads for MARS multiple launch rocket systems, air- and land-based standoff weapons, and cruise missiles.

CSU Backs Defense Minister Scholz in Rejecting Third Zero Option

AU0803152289 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 8 Mar 89 p 2

["hls." report: "CSU Promises To Back Scholz"]

[Text] Bonn—The Christian Social Union [CSU] Land Group has promised to back Defense Minister Scholz in rejecting a third zero option. During the negotiations on conventional disarmament, the FRG, as a country in the heart of Europe, has to insist on balanced disarmament and avoid zones of different security and new regional superiorities, it was stated. Scholz will also be supported if he accelerates the progress of the work on an overall NATO concept. It must not fall behind the decisions of the NATO summit of 2 March 1988, it was stated. The Soviet Union "is continuously modernizing," therefore the CSU confirms the United States' right to study and develop new short-range systems, even though the decisions on introducing them need not be made before 1990.

FRANCE

Editorial Views Soviet Strategy for CFE Talks

PM0803160289 Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Mar 89 p 1

[Editorial: "Disarmament: Two Approaches in Vienna"]

[Text] How should disarmament be started? Should it be started in certain well-defined spheres so as to deal with the problems case by case and in stages or, instead, in a comprehensive way on several "fronts" at the same time? These different approaches, already observed in other similar forums, appeared again at the start of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe in the proposals put forward by the Atlantic Alliance on the one hand and by Mr Shevardnadze, on behalf of the Warsaw Pact, on the other.

Without officially casting doubt on the mandate adopted for this conference last January, the Soviet minister dwelt on two spheres which it does not include: naval forces and short-range nuclear weapons. Of course, according to him, it is possible to "make more rapid progress toward disarmament in some spheres than in others," but it would be "naïve to think that they are not related." These are all reasons why the Soviet foreign minister called for "a very broad approach to disarmament, including nuclear, chemical, conventional, and other weapons."

The mention of naval forces and short-range nuclear weapons is no coincidence: The former is one of the few spheres in which NATO has a clear superiority and members of the Soviet military recently explained that they wanted to find compensation in this sphere for the sacrifices which they will have to make in land forces.

The latter sphere relates to the delicate question of the modernization of NATO's Lance missiles—on which the FRG has many reservations. Not content with turning the knife in the wound by stating that modernization will be likely to "destroy the fragile confidence which has just emerged," Mr Shevardnadze called for negotiations to be started "as quickly as possible" on "the reduction and elimination" of these weapons.

This "globalization" could go even further because the Soviet minister, condemning the "excessive levels of arms" in two areas near to Europe—the Near East and Southeast Asia—went so far as to conclude that "the disarmament process in Europe and the process of finding a settlement in the Near East should be synchronized." That is going too far, and there is reason to wonder whether, by trying to link everything, we will return to the grandiose plans for "general and complete disarmament" launched by Khrushchev 30 years ago which never succeeded.

Conditions are undoubtedly much better today: Mr Shevardnadze's insistence on the need for making intentions clear and on the importance of verification bears witness to a desire to open a serious debate, as does the skill with which Moscow has adjusted its fundamental proposals to those made by NATO. The fact remains that the Western countries will find it difficult to keep the negotiations within the very strict framework they had established.

ITALY

Commentaries on January Paris Chemical Weapons Conference

Conference 'Not a Failure'

52002410 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 12 Jan 89 p 7

[Article by Gianni Marsilli]

[Text] Paris—The compromise formula is as follows: "The participating countries are committed to furthering international peace and security in the world according to the

United Nations Charter and to promoting effective steps toward disarmament. In this context, they are determined to prevent any use of chemical weapons and to completely eliminate them..." A sixth paragraph was then inserted to underscore "the necessity to pursue, with determination, efforts for insuring full and across-the-board disarmament under effective international control..."

Nuclear weapons therefore are included, but implicitly and within the context of a future total disarmament. Another obstacle was also overcome, that is, the Iraqi opposition to any reference to recent Baghdad employment of chemical weapons. The Iraqi minister of foreign affairs did not object to the sentence in the first paragraph which states: "They (the signatory countries—editor's note) express once again their deep concern for the recent violations like those which have been ascertained and condemned by the competent authorities of the United Nations..." Iraq was not explicitly mentioned, but it was exactly that country which has been condemned by the UN. Nevertheless, the Iraqi wanted to stress their "constructive attitude", which they will continue to pursue, as was mentioned by the foreign minister who added, "The past is the past, let's look forward," and this was said also in view of the upcoming Geneva negotiations.

The second point of the Declaration confirms the validity of the 1925 protocol. The third "underlines the necessity to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement on curtailing the modernizing, manufacture, stockpiling, and use of all chemical weapons... This agreement will be universal, all-inclusive, and verifiable." The fourth point calls on the signatory countries to give proof of a "sense of responsibility" until the approval of the Geneva Convention. The fifth underlines the role of the UN, and in particular the investigating role of the secretary general in case of violations of the Geneva protocol. The sixth sees chemical disarmament within the framework of a more "general and complete disarmament."

Did the North or South win? This is a legitimate question considering the obstacle course of the Conference. According to Minister Andreotti, who was in Paris yesterday, everyone has taken a step forward. The proof of this is that the Conference was not a failure: Failure of this Conference, that is, a conclusion not supported unanimously, would have been a diplomatic failure. French Foreign Minister Dumas is more enthusiastic (obviously because he organized the Conference): "It is a historic document, the objectives were achieved." The chief of the Syrian diplomatic delegation was happy because of the mention of the "general disarmament," and considered it a victory for the Arabs. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov had already declared Tuesday night that "the Conference was doomed to succeed."

But in conclusion the chemical question is still open. Certainly, Paris signifies the first concrete achievement at the international level after 63 years, and constitutes an excellent starting point for Geneva. The ultimate objective of the majority can be considered achieved.

One cannot even talk of a unanimous South present at Paris: There was no harmony between Arabs and non-aligned countries, since the former, with the allusion to Israeli nuclear armaments, aimed at including the Middle East in the diplomatic game, while the latter were mostly in disagreement. The only country expressing serious reservations on the document, but not to the point of rejecting it, was Iran, who complained of the absence of a "clearer message" on the recent use of chemical weapons, and expressed the hope that the negotiations would not lose "that momentum given by the death of thousands of Iranians." In reality, many of the dead were Kurds, but that was a name that never crossed the lips of either the Iranians or the Iraqis.

Arab Failures Noted

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 12 Jan 89 p 11

[Article by Vladimiro Odinzov]

[Text] Paris—Yesterday, after five days of debate, the curtain fell on the Paris conference on chemical weapons and the results are condensed in a final declaration in terms that had been foreseen after the first few working sessions.

Interest was concentrated on the Arab opposition to the West which was mediated by the non-aligned countries who were searching for a compromise which would at least save the appearances of this conference. But the amendment war had already been lost by the Arabs yesterday morning when the plenary committee, led by Sorsa of Finland and responsible for preparing the final text, had refused the request of the non-aligned to modify the fourth paragraph of the document so as to include, at least partially, the Arabs' arguments.

The revised text would have expressed "the concern of the participating countries on the possession, preparation, updating, fabrication, stockpiling, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction."

In the compromise version the reference to nuclear weapons was very vague, and recognizable only by those that have followed the debates and press conferences on the need to equate chemical weapons to nuclear weapons and therefore to proceed toward a parallel prohibition of both weapon systems.

But not even this tenuous link was acceptable for a block which—under the banner of East-West easing of tensions—saw a convergence of interests of both Western and Eastern Europe, with the exception of Romania who, disregarding the warnings from the USSR, continued to the last moment to align herself with the Arab world and defended the necessity for a "simultaneous chemical and nuclear disarmament within the same

context." And Soviet Ambassador Nazarkin emphasized in a press conference that any attempt to read such a connection between the lines of the declaration had no foundation.

And so the Arabs were conceded only a few watered down sentences which—as Syria noted ironically—hope for “the continuation of an effective process of disarmament” and underline “the need to achieve a general and complete disarmament under international control.”

That was the maximum that Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria were able to get, and in the declarations that preceded and followed the “approval by consensus” of the final act (accepted and signed without reservation by all the 49 countries present in Paris) the Arabs has to grin and take it as they weighed the pros and cons of voting against the declaration.

Nevertheless, some manifested their dissent. The Iranian pointed out that, after all, the document “does not reflect at all the reasons for having called this Conference;” and the Iraqis, once again the target of Khomeini’s officers, this time kept quiet, but expressed their disappointment by launching a short warning: Minister Tarik Aziz said, “After all, the Paris Conference is certainly not the last chance to continue a battle along lines which have barely been open.”

Looking at the six points of the final act, everyone should, nevertheless, be satisfied.

The rich and technologically developed North was able to keep chemical and nuclear weapons in two separate baskets, and the United States (challenging a bit what was after all the spirit of the Conference) declared that they will continue the production of even more advanced systems. The Soviet Union specified that for now it has no intention of eliminating its entire chemical weapon arsenal.

The South, in turn, played on the ambiguity of having to guarantee its security with any weapon at its disposal, protesting against any provision that would have prevented the development of its chemical sector.

If the South has obtained a point in its favor it was because it had available an international platform and forum which, like it or not, showed in all its realities (also thanks to the horrifying photographic documentation distributed by the Iranian errand-boys) that the existence of a linkage between systems of mass destruction of chemical and nuclear nature can be negated but not ignored.

And the final declaration could not but implicitly recognize this fact when it sustains the “unanimous determination to prevent the recourse to chemical weapons and condemn their use”, but in the context of a “total process of disarmament.”

But it can't do any more than to invite the parties to “sign a treaty in the shortest possible time” giving the UN “full powers to control this process of disarmament by intervening against all violations.”

The countries present in Paris express, on the other hand, their “concern for the threat to peace and international security caused by the presence and proliferation of chemical weapons.” Until there is an accord which would forbid all uses of chemical weapons, the document can nevertheless, express an exhortation to all countries “to act responsibly by abiding to the objectives of the final act of the Conference.”

Commenting on the results of this reunion, Foreign Minister Andreotti pointed out that, in spite of the positions taken during the debates, the real outcome will only be known in Geneva at the negotiating table for chemical weapons. Nazarkin explained that the main obstacle to these negotiations was the lack of directives on the part of many delegations; this difficulty may be overcome from the momentum gained by the Paris Conference.

In a sequence of declarations the United States, the Soviet Union, and all the other Western nations expressed their satisfaction for the achievements of the Conference.

On the other hand, there was silence on the part of the Arabs who disappeared immediately after the final act were read in the hall. Maybe Aziz was right: Paris has only opened up a road, and only later we shall see how this road will be taken by the countries which have crowded the halls of UNESCO these days for a debate that probably did not satisfy all expectations.

NORWAY

Editorial Calls CFE Talks ‘Extremely Significant Challenge for Norway’

52002415 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
3 Feb 89 p 2

[Editorial: “A Challenge for Norway”]

[Text] Serious propaganda—that’s what people this week aptly called Moscow’s display of detailed lists of figures for military troops in Europe. This is the first time the Russians have made use of their new openness on such issues: The figures are broken down for individual countries in East and West, including figures for Norway’s Armed Forces. There is reason to take Moscow’s figures seriously, even if on many points they deviate from the data NATO submitted in November. Categories for the various weapon types do not match, and in the commotion surrounding a new round of negotiations the Russians are also taking their bargaining tactics into account. Propaganda is present, too.

The Russians' initiative differs from NATO's on one particularly important point. Despite the explicit agreement of East and West to keep naval forces out of the Vienna talks on "conventional stability" in Europe, Moscow has included naval forces in its lists. This shows that the Soviet Union has not really abandoned its attempt to drag naval forces into the perhaps crucial political tug of war surrounding the negotiations.

For the Atlantic Alliance and especially for Norway, vulnerable in location and dependent on naval support, it is very important to note the Soviets' long-term intention. We should remind the Soviets of the built-in military advantage they have in their alliance: the Soviet lines of communication are considerably shorter than NATO's and run overland.

The remaining dissimilarities in figures can probably be sorted out in Vienna, and it is grounds for optimism that the Russians admit their great superiority not only in tanks but also in number of launchpads—the ratio is 1608 to 136—for tactical missiles.

For Norway the negotiations in Vienna are an extremely significant challenge. Very few people seem to realize that this is in fact the first time since the war that we have been full-fledged participants in substantial disarmament talks which also encompass our own territory. Well-intended phrases and assurances of goodwill will no longer be enough. We must be up to date in technical know-how and political assessment in order to achieve a disarmament which does not create new ambiguity and increased uncertainty but which helps us reach our real goal: greater security with fewer weapons.

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